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RECENT CASES
EVIDENE-DE LAATIONS RECOUNTIITG DEFENDANT'S PHYSICAL
ATTACKS ON DEOLARANT AmE NOT ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE OF
DECLARANT'S STATE OF MIN
Defendant went to the home of his former wife and shot and killed her
and her male companion. He was charged with first degree murder and
defended on the ground that the killings had been without premeditation
and deliberation and that he had gone to his wife's house at her invitation.
In rebuttal the prosecution introduced, over objection, statements made by
the wife to witnesses that she was afraid of the defendant, that he had
beaten her, and that he had threatened to kill her. Although the jury was
instructed that these declarations were being admitted only to show the
wife's state of mind when she made them, and not to prove that defendant
had beaten her, the Supreme Court of California held the admission of the
declarations that recounted beatings to be reversible error because the jury
could not infer the wife's state of fear without also inferring that defendant
had beaten her. The otherwise admissible declarations telling of threats
made by the defendant were also held inadmissible on the ground that they
were made under conditions that indicated they were probably not trust-
worthy.1 People v. Hamilton, 362 P.2d 473, 13 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1961).
The state-of-mind exception 2 to the hearsay rule 3 permits the admis-
sion of extrajudicial declarations in two situations. When the fact in issue
is the occurrence of an external physical act, declarations of state of mind
may be introduced when they state an intention to do the act,4 but not
' The declarations directly asserting state of mind were also held inadmissible
because of the cumulative nature of the testimony which the prosecution introduced
on this point.
2 UNIFORM Ruiz OF EVIDENCE 63(12) ; McCoRmicx, EVIDENCE §§ 225, 228, 268-71
(1954) ; 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1714-40 (3d ed. 1940).
3 The rule against hearsay excludes evidence of a statement which was made out
of court and which is being offered to prove the truth of what is asserted. The theory
underlying exclusion is that the trier is forced to rely on the declarant's memory,
sincerity, perception and use of language without the declarant being subjected to
oath or cross-examination. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 225, at 460; 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1362. Professor Morgan has suggested that the classification of a statement as
hearsay should not be determined by whether it fits the definition of "extra-judicial
utterance offered for the truth of the matter asserted," as Wigmore has stated, but
by whether the four hearsay dangers are present. Nor, he asserts, should the classifi-
cation of a statement as hearsay serve to exclude it from evidence; admissibility
should also turn on the applicability of the hearsay dangers. See Morgan, Hearsay
Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARv. L. Rav. 177 (1948).
4 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U. S. 285 (1892) ; People v. Alcade, 24
Cal. 2d 177, 148 P.2d 627 (1944); State v. Journey, 115 Conn. 344, 161 At. 515
(1932) ; Commonwealth v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 180, 31 N.E. 961 (1892) ; Common-
wealth v. Wilson, 394 Pa. 588, 148 A.2d 234, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 844 (1959) ; see
Hinton, States of Mind and the Hearsay Ride, 1 U. CHaI. L. REv. 394, 409-10 (1934).
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when they relate the memory or belief that the act was done.5 When the
declarant's state of mind itself is in issue, courts have admitted for their
truth evidence of direct assertions of state of mind.6 When the declarations
describe external facts from which the state of mind of the declarant may
be inferred, the evidence is admissible if accompanied by an instruction that
it is being admitted for the sole purpose of inferring declarant's mental
state.7  Such circumstantial use of extrajudicial statements does not come
within the prohibition of the hearsay rule since the assertions are not used
for their truth.8  When admission to show declarant's fear has been sus-
tained on this ground, the declarations, unlike those rejected in the present
case, have generally related threats rather than past acts."
The court in the present case advanced the theory that the jury could
infer declarant's mental state of fear from her declarations describing
former beatings only if it believed that defendant had in fact beaten her.10
Therefore, the court reasoned, since the declarant's state of mind and the
truth of the declarations are logically inseparable, the jury could not dis-
tinguish between the two, notwithstanding the clear mandate of the limiting
instructions. This conclusion of logical inseparability relies on the implicit
premise that, assuming sincerity, declarant's belief must necessarily coincide
with the truth of the matter stated. But it is conceivable that declarant
5 Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933) ; People v. Talle, 111 Cal. App.
2d 650, 245 P.2d 633 (1952) ; see UNIFoRM RULE OF EVIDENcE 63(12) ; 5 WIGaMRE,
EVIDENCE § 1362 (3d ed. 1940). Following the Hilhnmt case, Professor Seligman
wrote an article setting forth the thesis that the Hillmon doctrine of admitting state-
ments of intention to prove a future act could be extended to permit statements of
memory to prove a past act and thereby undermine the rule against hearsay. Seligman,
An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 26 HARv. L. Rav. 146 (1912); see Hinton, supra
note 4, at 420. Several years later, Professor Maguire, finding the proposition dis-
quieting, suggested that the Hilmon rule be limited to future acts. Maguire, The
Hillmon Case-Thirty-three Years After, 38 HARv. L. REV. 709 (1925). Mr. Justice
Cardozo, in his opinion in Shepard, took up Magnire's suggestion, stating that Hill-
mm "marks the high water line beyond which courts have been unwilling to go."
290 U.S. at 105. But there is also a minority view, holding that declarations of state
of mind are admissible to prove past acts, of which Lloyd v. Powell Duffryn Steam
Coal Co., [1914] A.C. 733, is the leading case. In will contests, courts have made a
special exception to admit statements of present state of mind to prove past acts.
In the Matter of Estate of Thompson, 200 Cal. 410, 253 Pac. 697 (1927).
6 E.g., Clemens v. Richards, 304 Ky. 154, 200 S.W.2d 156 (1947) ; Commonwealth
v. Santos, 275 Pa. 515, 119 Atl. 596 (1923) ; State v. Bauers, 25 Wash. 2d 825, 172
P.2d 279 (1946).
7E.g., People v. Atchley, 53 Cal. 2d 160, 346 P.2d 764 (1959), cert. dismissed,
366 U.S. 207 (1961) ; Adkins v. Brett, 184 Cal. 252, 193 Pac. 251 (1920) ; Lowrey v.
State, 87 Okla. Crim. 313, 197 P.2d 637 (1948) ; Brown v. Coca-Cola Bottling, Inc.,
54 Wash. 2d 665, 344 P.2d 207 (1959).
8 The classification of an extrajudicial statement as hearsay depends on the pur-
pose for which it is to be used. If offered in proof of what the statement asserts,
it is hearsay and inadmissible unless it comes within one of the exceptions to the
hearsay rule. But when the statement is offered only to show that the declarant made
such a statement, it is being used circumstantially and is not open to a hearsay objection.
People v. Brust, 47 Cal. 2d 776, 306 P.2d 480 (1957) ; McCoRmIcK, EViDENCE § 225
(1954); 6 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 1766 (3d ed. 1940).
9 E.g., People v. Merkouris, 52 Cal. 2d 672, 344 P.2d 1 (1959), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 943 (1960) ; State v. Bauers, 25 Wash. 2d 825, 172 P.2d 279 (1946). But see
People v. Purvis, 362 P.2d 713, 13 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1961) ; cf. People v. Feasby, 178
Cal. App. 2d 723, 3 Cal. Rptr. 230 (Dist. Ct App. 1960).
10 Instant case at 482, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 658.
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may have had a sincere belief as to a past act which does not correspond
with fact. In such a case, state of mind does not depend on the veracity of
the declaration'" but is inferred from the declarant's belief; for it is belief,
not fact, that determines state of mind.1 Thus, the utterance of the state-
ment-being evidence of the declarant's belief-provides the basis for in-
ferring that declarant feared defendant.13  This distinction is important if
admission of the extrajudicial declaration is justified by the absence of
some of the hearsay dangers.' 4 If state of mind were inferred from the
truth of the statements, all of the hearsay dangers-insincerity, mispercep-
tion, faulty memory, and improper use of language-would be present. On
the other hand, an inference based only on the fact of declarant's utterance
of the statement eliminates the hearsay dangers of faulty memory and
misperception. And the often present danger of declarant's insincerity is
partially eliminated by the requirement that a declaration be made under
conditions indicating probable trustworthiness to be admissible.
Although the court rejected the admission of declarations of past acts,
it stated, on the basis of California precedent,15 that declarations relating
threats are admissible to show declarant's state of mind.16 Since the
making of a threat is as much a past act as beating the declarant, under
the court's prior reasoning the truth of the statement that the threat was
made cannot logically be separated from the inference of fear to be drawn
from the fact that the declarant made the statement. Therefore, the court's
distinction, which allows only declarations describing threats to be used
circumstantially, seems logically inconsistent.17 The distinction may, how-
ever, be justified under the general rule that evidence of crimes independent
of the one charged is inadmissible because of the natural tendency of the
jury to give excessive weight to such evidence, either by making an im-
"1 See McCoRmcx, EVIDENcE § 268, at 568 (1954).
12 The court suggests, however, that even if belief can vary from fact, when the
belief concerns past criminal acts, the jury will be unable to take this possible variation
into account. To support this point, the court notes that the prosecutor himself,
although trained in the law, repeatedly confused the fact and the belief in the course
of his argument to the jury. Instant case at 484, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 660.
13 See McCoRmicx, EVIDENCE § 268 (1954); 6 WIGMoRE, EVIENCE § 1715 (3d
ed. 1940).
14 See note 3 .mipra.
35 People v. Atchley, 53 Cal. 2d 160, 346 P.2d 764 (1959), cert. dismissed, 366
U.S. 207 (1961) ; People v. Brust, 47 Cal. 2d 776, 306 P.2d 480 (1957).1 6 Instant case at 480, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 656.
'7 This logical gap may be explained by the court's confusion of two types of cases
in which extrajudicial declarations are admitted: those in which the declarant's state
of mind is in issue, and those in which an external physical act is in question, as in
Hillno or Shepard. In the latter cases a distinction is drawn between declarations
of intent which are admissible and declarations of memory which are not, see notes 4
and 5 supra and accompanying text, based on the fact that when extrajudicial state-
ments are introduced for their truth, there are fewer hearsay dangers present with
respect to statements relating intent, than with those relating memory. In the case
of declarations to prove the mental state of the declarant, the dangers of hearsay are
reduced to a minimum regardless of whether they relate intent or memory. See
Hinton, smpra note 5, at 414; notes 10-13 spra and accompanying text. Thus, the
reasons supporting the distinction of the Hifnon and Shepard cases between declara-
tions of memory and intent are inapplicable when the declarant's state of mind is in
issue, although the distinction may be valid for other reasons. See notes 22-23 infra
and accompanying text.
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proper inference from the former conduct to the act charged or by con-
demning the defendant on the basis of the past act, irrespective of his guilt
on the present charge.' 8 The danger of attributing undue weight to evi-
dence of threats made by the defendant is not as great, and consequently
the courts have generally sustained its admission.19 The fact that the
evidence of threats or prior acts is in the form of hearsay, as in the instant
case, would not appear to make the rule inapplicable.
The court's decision-though not its opinion--effects a compromise
which sacrifices theory to practicality, trusting to limiting instructions in
the case of declarations describing threats, but rejecting them as to declara-
tions of past acts. This sweeping rejection of declarations of past acts
tends to undermine the effective determination of declarant's contemporane-
ous mental state by rendering inadmissible that evidence most likely to be
indicative of state of mind. A subjective condition of fear or anger is more
likely to be engendered by a past act of brutality than by an unexecuted
threat of harm.20 The high probative value of such evidence requires that
it be admitted unless there is both a probability of jury misuse of the evi-
dence and a possibility that the misuse will prejudice the defendant. In
the present case both these dangers are clearly present. The difficulty of
a lay mind in following the technical rule set out by the limiting instruc-
tions 21 coupled with the highly inflammatory nature of statements of
defendant's alleged past conduct and the cumulative nature of the testimony
created a strong likelihood of prejudice. 22  But the court, in its failure to
articulate standards through which the practical considerations of each case
would he given full weight and in its formulation of a strict and theoreti-
cally indefensible rule, may well have caused the exclusion in future cases
of vital and unobjectionable evidence.
2 3
18 People v. Lapin, 138 Cal. App. 2d 251, 291 P.2d 575 (1956) ; People v. Car-
valho, 112 Cal. App. 2d 482, 246 P.2d 950 (1952) ; People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264,
61 N. E. 286 (1901); 1 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE §§ 192, 194 (3d ed. 1940). However,
evidence of other crimes is competent to prove the specific crime charged when such
evidence tends to establish (1) motive, (2) intent, (3) absence of mistake or accident,
(4) a common scheme concerning two or more crimes so related to each other that
proof of one tends to establish the others, or (5) identity of the defendant charged
with the crime on trial. People v. Zatzke, 33 Cal. 2d 480, 202 P.2d 1009 (1949);
People v. Peete, 28 Cal. 2d 306, 169 P.2d 924, cert. denied, 329 U.S. 790 (1946).
19 E.g., People v. Gross, 123 Cal. 389, 55 Pac. 1054 (1899) ; People v. Chaves,
122 Cal. 134, 54 Pac. 596 (1898) ; see note 9 supra. But see Holman v. Commonwealth,
291 Ky. 622, 165 S.W.2d 167 (1942) (threats are competent to show motive or
accused's state of mind, but are inadmissible as evidence that defendant committed
the crime in issue).
20 See instant case at 485-86, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 661-62 (dissenting opinion).
2 ' The court found a strong likelihood that the jury in the instant case, despite
the limiting instructions, used the victim's statements relating assaults and beatings
by the defendant as proof of these acts. See note 12 supra.2 2 In addition, the relevance of the evidence on the issue of premeditation was
slight in comparison to its potential prejudice.
23A more flexible approach than any possible under preformulated rules would
be to grant the trial judge greater discretion to rule on admissibility according to
the facts of each case, reserving for the appellate court the right to reverse when
there has been a elear abuse of discretion. See instant case at 486-87, 13 Cal. Rptr.
at 662-63 (dissenting opinion) ; UNiFORM RULE OF EVDENCE 63(12) ; Donnelly, The
Hearsay Ride and Its Ex-ceptions, 40 MINN. L. Rnv. 455 (1956); Morgan, supra
note 3, at 218.
RECENT CASES
FAMILY LAW-IN SECOND WIFE'S SUIT FOR SEPARATE MAINTE-
NANCE, ]HUSBAND HEL ESTOPPED To DENY THE VAi niTy OF TEEm
MARRIAGE DESPITE SECOND WIFE'S KNOWLEDGE AT TIME OP MAR-
RIAGE THAT HuSBAND 'S MAIL-ORDER" DIVORCE FROM FIRST WIFE
WAs PROBABLY INVALID
In 1944 plaintiff-husband wanted a divorce in order to marry defend-
ant, who was then his paramour. His wife refused to cooperate and he was
unable to leave the vicinity of his New York domicile. Relying on a
lawyer's advice that a Mexican "mail-order" divorce, though of doubtful
validity, would be "good until . . . questioned," husband and defendant
agreed that he should obtain such a divorce. Upon receiving the decree
the couple went to Connecticut, thought by them to be lenient in examining
previous divorces, and participated in a marriage ceremony. After fifteen
years of cohabitation the husband sued for an annulment in the District
of Columbia, asserting that his divorce had been a nullity and that there-
fore his remarriage was void. The "second wife" counterclaimed for
separate maintenance. The trial court found the litigants to be in pari
delicto, neither one deserving affirmative relief, but it accepted the hus-
band's argument that the "marriage" was void and granted the annulment
in order to clarify the marital status of the parties.' The Municipal Court
of Appeals affirmed.2 On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, the decree was reversed and the case remanded. The court
held that despite the voidness of the divorce-remarriage transaction, the
husband was estopped, for the purposes of the "wife's" counterclaim, to
deny the validity of their "marriage." Sears v. Sears, 293 F.2d 884 (D.C.
Cir. 1961).
Equitable estoppel has often been used to preclude assertion of the
invalidity of a sister-state divorce secured through a fraudulent representa-
tion of domicile when the litigant attacking a marriage after such a
divorce either obtained the divorce himself or was an active participant in
obtaining one for his former wife or for his present "spouse." 3  Courts
' Sears v. Sears, Civil Docket No. D-1546-59, D.C. Munic. Ct, June 6, 1960,
pp. 3, 20. The trial court did not view the granting of the annulment as affirmative
relief, although it admitted that under the circumstances the "husband" was very
likely to be the party "more greatly to be benefited by the decision." Id. at 20. The
"second' wife conceded that "an annulment would of course free plaintiff from all
obligation to contribute to the support of defendant .B..." Erief for Appellant,
p. 8, Sears v. Sears, 293 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
2166 A.2d 748 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1960).
a E.g., Krause v. Krause, 282 N.Y. 355, 26 N.E.2d 290 (1940) ; McNeir v. McNeir,
178 Va. 285, 16 S.E.2d 632 (1941) ; accord, RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWs § 112
(1934, Supp. 1948). Contra, Gardner v. Gardner, 110 S.E.2d 495 (W. Va. 1959)
(construing statute). For other situations in which estoppel is applied, see Clark,
Estoppel Against Jurisdictional Attack on Decrees of Divorce, 70 YALE L.J. 45, 47-49
(1960). A spouse who neither participates nor remarries in reliance upon the other
spouses invalid divorce remains free to attack the other spouse's remarriage. See,
e.g., Brandt v. Brandt, 76 Ariz. 154, 261 P.2d 978 (1953) ; Schneider v. Schneider,
281 App. Div. 250, 119 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1953). However, the nonparticipating spouse
may be estopped by his subsequent conduct. See, e.g., Attebery v. Attebery, 172 Neb.
671, 111 N.W.2d 553 (1961).
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have rationalized this use of estoppel on the ground that a party may not
assume inconsistent positions when his doing so would reveal his participa-
tion in a fraud upon the divorce-granting court 4 or would injure a person
who had changed position in reliance upon the earlier actions of the party
to be estopped.5 Although American courts have therefore been willing to
give some legal effect to void sister-state divorces through the application
of equitable estoppel, they have been reluctant to treat Mexican mail-order
divorces in the same manner.6 Generally, they have refused to apply
estoppel to mail-order divorces and have held such decrees-obtained
quickly and inexpensively without leaving home-to be legal nullities which
create neither rights nor duties.7  Domicile is the basis of divorce juris-
diction in the United States," but it is not a prerequisite of jurisdiction
for the granting of mail-order divorces, and American courts have seized
upon this fact to rationalize their more hostile treatment of the Latin short-
cut to remarriage: attacks on such decrees need not reveal a fraud upon
an earlier court's jurisdiction.9 Behind this formal justification is the more
fundamental, though less often articulated, rationale that protection of
"easy" Mexican divorces by means of estoppel would induce more people
to seek them and would thereby undermine the efficacy of the more strin-
gent local divorce laws.' 0 While estoppel has been occasionally applied to
4 See, e.g., Curry v. Curry, 79 F.2d 172, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1935) ; Caldwell v. Cald-
well, 298 N.Y. 146, 149-50, 81 N.E.2d 60, 62 (1948); Note, 36 ST. JoHnt's L. REv.
126, 133 (1961).
5See Estate of Shank, 154 Cal. App. 2d 808, 316 P.2d 710 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957);
Lanigan v. Lanigan, 78 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1955) (dictum) (language of laches) ; Packer
v. Packer, 6 App. Div. 2d 464, 179 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1958) (alternative holding);
Clark, supra note 3, at 56-57.
6 Compare Krause v. Krause, 282 N.Y. 355, 26 N.E.2d 290 (1940), ith Caldwell
v. Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146, 81 N.E.2d 60 (1948). Compare Commonwealth ex rel.
Wenz v. Wenz, 195 Pa. Super. 593, 171 A.2d 529 (1961), with Commonwealth ex rel.
Allison v. Allison, 151 Pa. Super. 369, 30 A.2d 365 (1943). Compare Atlantic Ref.
Co. v. Jones, 63 N.M. 236, 316 P.2? 557 (1957) (alternative holding), with Golden v.
Golden, 41 N.M. 356, 68 P.2d 928 (1937).
7 See, e.g., instant case at 888; Tonti v. Chadwick, 1 NJ. 531, 64 A.2d 436 (1949);
Caldwell v. Caldwell, supra note 6; Smith v. Smith, 72 Ohio App. 203, 50 N.E.2d 889
(1943). But see note 11 infra and accompanying text.
8 Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 349 (1948) ; Williams v. North Carolina, 325
U.S. 226, 229 (1945).
9 See, e.g., Garman v. Garman, 102 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1939) ; Caldwell v. Cald-
well, 298 N.Y. 146, 81 N.E.2d 60 (1948) ; Senor v. Senor, 272 App. Div. 306, 70 N.Y.
S.Zd 909 (1947) (dictum), aff'd iner., 297 N.Y. 800, 78 N.E.2d 20 (1948); Note, 34
N.Y.U.L. Rav. 754, 762 (1959). If both parties to a marriage appear and participate
in a sister state divorce proceeding, that state's finding of domicile is conclusive, and
the full faith and credit clause compels other states to recognize the validity of the
divorce. Sherrer v. Sherrer, supra note 8. If, however, the sister state proceeding
is ex parte, other states need recognize the divorce only if their courts find there
actually was domicile. Williams v. North Carolina, supra note 8.
10 See Golden v. Golden, 41 N.M. 356, 369, 68 P.2d 928, 935 (1937) ; Clark, supra
note 3, at 53; Note, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rtv. 754, 762 (1959). It has been said, however,
that "the difference between spending forty-two days in Reno, or ninety days in
Florida, and getting a divorce by mail from Mexico does not seem fundamental enough
to justify an estoppel in the first two cases, and a denial of estoppel in the third ..
Clark, upra note 3, at 64.
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preclude attacks on mail-order decrees,'1 the cases applying it have usually
involved a party's attempt to share-to the detriment of an innocent person
-in the estate of a former spouse from whom the estopped party had
secured the Mexican divorce. Prior to the instant case, the outer limit of
the application of estoppel in suits for annulments of marriages based on
mail-order divorces was marked by the California case of Harlan v.
Harlan.12 There a man had brought to the United States a married Cuban
woman who neither spoke nor understood English. On a lawyer's advice
that a mail-order decree would free the woman, the man arranged her
divorce, paid all expenses, and lived with her for twelve years. In the
man's action for an annulment, the court described the woman as an "in-
nocent party" who had been "imposed upon," and it held the "husband"
estopped to attack the validity of their "marriage." The court in the present
case, by using estoppel to protect a party who clearly was not "innocent,"
went beyond Harlan, and its decision constitutes an expansion of the limits
of the estoppel doctrine in the context of defective foreign divorces.
In the present case both parties intended to enter what they knew
might be a bigamous marriage. Though neither deserved judicial protec-
tion from the consequences of his attempt to circumvent local marriage
laws, the very nature of the "wife's" counterclaim made it inevitable that
one party would receive such protection. To estop the "husband's" attack
on the "marriage" meant treating the "wife" as legal spouse probably
entitled to separate maintenance; '3 to sustain the attack meant permitting
the "husband" to withdraw with impunity from the responsibilities of a
relationship which he instigated. Faced with these alternatives, the court
eschewed an illusory course of judicial inaction based on the equal fault of
the parties and instead looked through their past errors to the underlying
personal relationship which had been established between them and based
its decision on the actual circumstances existing at the time of the suit.' 4
The "wife," although at fault in her decision to marry following the
mail-order divorce, adhered to that decision and for fifteen years performed
11 See, e.g., Unruh v. Industrial Comm'n, 81 Ariz. 118, 301 P.2d 1029 (1956);
Estate of Edgett, 188 Cal. App. 2d 700, 10 Cal. Rptr. 552 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961);
Estate of Shank, 154 Cal. App. 2d 808, 316 P.2d 710 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957) ; Stevely
v. Stevely, 254 App. Div. 743, 4 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1938); Dorn v. Dorn, 202 Misc. 1057,
112 N.Y.S.2d 90 (Sup. Ct. 1952), aff'd on other grounds, 282 App. Div. 597, 126
N.Y.S.2d 713 (1953). Compare Matter of Rathscheck, 300 N.Y. 346, 90 N.E.2d
887 (1950). A New Jersey statute barring annulments to parties with "unclean
hands" has been applied to marriages based on "mail order" divorces. Tonti v. Chad-
wick, 1 N.J. 531, 64 A.2d 436 (1949). Tonti was followed in Apelbaum v. Apelbaum,
7 App. Div. 2d 911, 183 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1959) (alternative holding) (applying New
Jersey law).
12 70 Cal. App. 2d 657, 161 P.2d 490 (Dist. Ct. App. 1945).
13 Instant case at 888.
14 "[A] 'void' marriage is not a legal vacuum in all or even most cases-a rela-
tionship may have existed between the man and woman which, while not sufficient
to constitute a 'marriage' for most purposes, is the basis for some legal consequences.
The concept of 'voidness' should not obscure any such relationship as did exist" Note,
7 STAN. L. R-v. 529, 539 (1955).
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her functions as her "husband's" putative spouse. In the course of time
she formed reasonable expectations based on the continuation of their as-
sociation. In particular, she apparently came to rely upon her "husband"
to provide for her future financial security and consequently neglected to
plan ahead on her own. The "husband," on the other hand, had not
changed his financial position in reliance on the purported marriage. As
between these "spouses," the court was justified in finding that events
subsequent to the marriage ceremony-at which time the parties were in
pari delicto 15-constituted a change of position by the "wife" sufficient to
support estoppel. 6
This use of estoppel was an attempt to make a realistic adjustment,
elsewhere effected by statute,17 of the responsibilities of a quasi-marital
relationship. The limitations of the judicial process-conceptually the court
could not both declare the marriage completely void and at the same time
make it the basis of legal rights-raised two potential dangers: that the
rights of third parties, particularly those of the first and legal wife, might
be impaired, and that the public policy against recognition of mall-order
divorces might be undermined. The court skirted the first of these pitfalls
by treating the estoppel as purely a personal one, running only between
the parties to the litigation.' 8 On the other hand, the use of estoppel gave
some effect, however limited, to a hitherto worthless type of divorce
decree.' 9 If the effect of this holding is in fact to increase the attractiveness
of marriage after a mail-order divorce, the decision can to that extent be
criticized. However, despite the apparent increase in security to the
woman,2 0 the theory that resort to this type of divorce would increase as
a result of the present decision rests on the highly questionable premise
that the consequences of a dissolution of the prospective "marriage" play
a significant part in the decision of either party to rely on a mail-order
divorce. The danger does not appear to outweigh the need to do justice
in a particular case.
35 The opinion of the court of appeals-unlike the trial court-appears to give
the "wife" the benefit of every possible doubt as to her complicity. Compare instant
case at 885 & nI, with Sears v. Sears, Civil No. D-1546-59, D.C. Munic. Ct, June 6,
1960, pp. 18-19 (both litigants "deliberately and wilfully conspired to violate the law").
16 But see Amerling v. Amerling, 180 Misc. 701, 703, 41 N.Y.S.2d 623, 624 (Sup.
Ct 1943) : "[T]he original relationship of the parties was illegal and, no matter what
sacrifices the plaintiff may have made for the defendant, she was not in a position to
institute an action for a separation and maintenance . .. ."
'7 See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 1140-a, which authorizes New York courts to
award support "as justice requires" when a void marriage is declared a nullity. See
Gaines v. Jacobsen, 308 N.Y. 218, 225, 124 N.E.2d 290, 294-95 (1954); Johnson v.
Johnson, 295 N.Y. 477, 68 N.E.2d 499 (1946) ; Brown v. Brown, 282 App. Div. 726,
122 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1953), aff'd mem., 306 N.Y. 788, 118 N.E.2d 603 (1954) ; Shenker
v. Shenker, 18 Misc. 2d 606, 187 N.Y.S.2d 95 (Sup. Ct 1959).
1 Instant case at 887-88.
19 See, e.g., Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146, 151, 81 N.E.2d 60, 63 (1948).
See generally Note, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 754 (1959).
20 Conversely, the risks are increased for the "husband," who may face an obli-
gation to support both his legal wife and his "second" wife.
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Implicit in the rationale of the court's opinion is a separate problem
as to its scope. Since the underlying personal relationship of the parties-
the fifteen years of "marriage"--apparently was the crucial factor leading
the court to permit an award of maintenance to a woman whose marriage
was void ab initio, it may be hypothesized that the court could reach the
same result when an identical fifteen years follow a marriage ceremony
which was not preceded by even a mail-order divorce.2 1 A similar result
would also seem to follow when no second marriage ceremony was ever
performed, as in the conceivable situation of a woman suing for separate
maintenance under claim of being a common-law wife. The difference
between a fifteen-year association predicated upon a bigamous marriage
ceremony, known at the time to be so, and a like association without even
such a fraudulent ceremony seems slight. It is likely, however, that in
the latter case a court would conclude that the community would not toler-
ate such a condonation of adultery. It could distinguish the cases on the
ground that when a ceremony is performed, the man formally agrees to
take the woman as his wife and to accept the legal concomitants of mar-
riage, including the obligation of support, and though lacking the legal
capacity to marry, leads the woman to believe that he will not later raise
the question of that incapacity. His formal promise constitutes a basis for
the application of estoppel by creating expectations on the part of the
woman and by embellishing the illicit relationship with a colorable validity.
Such colorable validity enabled the court in the present case to prevent the
"husband" from enjoying the advantages of a marital relationship while
avoiding one of its most important responsibilities. The conduct of the
parties subsequent to their "marriage," coupled with the negligible effect
of the estoppel on third parties and on the efficacy of local marriage laws,
makes the result a proper one.
INJUNCTIONS-FDEAL COURT WHm GRANxTED PRIORITY IN
DiscovERY MAY ENJOIN UsE IN STATE COURT OF INFORMATION
DISCovERED UNTM OTHER PARTY HAS HAD EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
FOR FEDERAL DISCoVERY
In an action in a federal court for an injunction and damages for the
misappropriation of trade secrets, the district court had granted plaintiff's
motion for priority in taking depositions and had stayed defendant's dis-
covery until plaintiff had finished. After having taken depositions and
before defendants had completed their discovery, plaintiff brought an action
in a state court based on evidence divulged in federal discovery. On de-
fendants' motion, the federal district court enjoined plaintiff from using
21 See Johnson v. Johnson, 295 N.Y. 477, 68 N.E.2d 499 (1946) (arising under
statute).
1962]
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the information first learned through federal discovery in any other pro-
ceeding.1 As a result, plaintiff was unable to support its state action with
evidence, and the suit was dismissed. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that the district court injunction did not violate section
2283 of the Judicial Code,2 which limits federal stays of state court proceed-
ings, because an injunction of the use of federally discovered information
does not "stay proceedings in a State court" within the terms of that statute.
Further, the court stated that the implicit assumption of the discovery
priority order-that relief would be withheld until both parties had had an
equal opportunity to take discovery-is a judgment which the district court
could "protect or effectuate" under an explicit exception in section 2283.
Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 288 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1961).
The statutory exceptions in section 2283 permit federal injunctions of
state court proceedings "as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or
where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction,3 or to protect or effectuate its
judgments." 4 The legislative history 5 and background 6 of the third ex-
ception indicate only that it was designed to overrule Toucey v. New York
Life Ins. Co.,7 which had held that a federal court could not protect its
final judgment by enjoining a state court proceeding. Prior to the present
I "[The plaintiff . . .is hereby enjoined pending further order of the Court
from making any use whatsoever in any legal proceeding other than the proceeding
now pending in this Court of any information, material or evidence of facts which
first became known to or available to the plaintiff through its discovery and disclosure
proceedings in this case .... " Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, Civil Docket No.
7880, D. Conn., January 27, 1961.
228 U.S.C. §2283 (1958).
3 This exception is interpreted as authorizing a federal court with in rem juris-
diction to enjoin the parties from continuing a state court action which threatens to
interfere with its prior custody of the res. Alabama Vermiculite Corp. v. Patterson,
149 F. Supp. 534, 545-46 (W.D.S.C. 1955) (leased mine premises); De Korwin v.
First Natl Bank, 136 F. Supp. 720, 723 (N.D. Ill. 1955), appeal dismissed, 235
F.2d 156 (7th Cir. 1956) (trust fund); Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314
U.S. 118, 139 (1941) (dictum); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 229 (1922)
(dictum). Had the state court in the present case been allowed to enjoin defendant's
manufacturing, there was the possibility that defendant's business would have been
destroyed. A federal injunction would thus seem justifiable in order to avoid placing
the federal court in the position of reaching a final decision which is made meaningless
by the state court action. To this extent the present case involves a situation analogous
to the in rem exception with defendant's business in a position similar to the res.
Implicit in the priority order in the present case was defendant's right to the benefits
of federal discovery. This right, a product of the court's equity jurisdiction, see
note 30 infra, would have been lost had the state court been allowed to try the case
before defendant had the benefit of federal discovery. An injunction would appear
to be warranted in aid of the court's equity jurisdiction. See IA MooRE, FEDERAL
PRACTIcE f 0.225, at 2620 (2d ed. 1961); cf. Textile Prods. v. Formax Mfg. Corp.,
13 F.R.D. 302 (E.D. Mich. 1952), which is analytically similar to the present case
but in which the court was able to enter a default judgment and enjoin a pending state
action "to protect or effectuate its judgment." Id. at 303.
4 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1958).
5 See H. R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A181-82 (1947).
6 See Hearings on HR. 1600 and 2025 Before Subcmnmittee No. 1 of the House
Committee m the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 25, 29 (1947) (statement of Pro-
fessor Moore).
7 314 U.S. 118 (1941).
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case this exception had been applied to protect 8 only final judgments; 9
the question of whether it could be used to protect interlocutory orders had
not arisen.10
In construing section 2283, the Supreme Court has said, "legislative
policy is here expressed in a clear-cut prohibition qualified only by specifi-
cally defined exceptions." 11 This prohibition cannot be circumvented by
injunctions which run to a state court litigant 12 or to the enforcement of
the judgments of a state court 13 or administrative board.14  However, not
all federal orders which might ultimately result in the frustration of state
court proceedings are prohibited by the statute. A federal court may en-
join a federal officer from testifying in a state criminal trial with respect
to illegally seized evidence, although the state proceeding may, as a result,
be rendered nugatory.' 5 In addition, federal courts have stayed their own
discovery processes upon a showing that a plaintiff's primary motive in
8 While the third exception in § 2283 has generally been applied to protect federal
judgments from relitigation, it is not necessarily limited to such cases. In NLRB v.
Underwood Mach. Co., 198 F.2d 93 (1st Cir. 1952), the issues being tried by the
state court were completely different from those which the federal court had decided
and thus were in no danger of relitigation. However, the court said, in dictum, that
it had the power to enjoin the state proceeding and would have exercised this power
if the state action had threatened to nullify the effect of the federal judgment Id. at 95.
9 See, e.g., American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Taussig, 255 F.2d 765 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 883 (1958) ; Thomason v. Cooper, 254 F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1958);
Retail Clerks v. Your Food Stores, 225 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1955).
10 The question is posed in HART & WEcHsLER, THE FEDERAL CoURTS AND THE
FEDERAL Svsram 1075 (1953). The word "judgments" as used in § 2283 does not
include a consent decree, see West Virginia Oil & Gas Co. v. Breece Lumber Co.,
104 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. La. 1952); nor does it include the "informal thought" of a
federal district court judge that "a plea of nolo contendere does not carry with it any
civil penalties," Furnish v. Board of Medical Examiners, 257 F.2d 520, 523 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 883 (1958) ; however, it does include a default judgment,
Textile Prods. v. Formax Mfg. Corp., 13 F.R.D. 302 (E.D. Mich. 1952), see note 3
supra. According to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a "judgment' is "a decree
and any order from which an appeal lies." FED. R. Civ. P. 54(a). Since the order
in the present case did not contain a certification by the district judge that it involved
"a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference
of opinion," it was not within the appellate jurisdiction of the courts of appeals, as
defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1958). Thus it was not a "judgment' within the
context of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
11 Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 516 (1955).
According to the Court, this construction was intended to prevent the creation of
implied exceptions to § 2283. However, in Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States,
352 U.S. 220, 225-26 (1957), the Court did just that by holding that §2283 does not
apply when an injunction to stay state court proceedings is sought by the United
States.
12 H. J. Heinz Co. v. Owens, 189 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
905 (1952).
I3 Evans v. St Louis Housing Authority, 226 F.2d 750 (8th Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 993 (1956).
14 Furnish v. Board of Medical Examiners, 257 F.2d 520 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 882 (1958).
1 5 Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 215 (1956). The Court based its decision
on the power of the federal courts to enforce observance of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure by federal agents. While not dealing specifically with § 2283, the
Court stated that the injunction requested would not "in any way . . .interfere
with state agencies in enforcement of state law." Id. at 216. Cf. Wilson v. Schnettler,
365 U.S. 381 (1961).
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bringing a federal suit was to obtain information for use in a pending
state court action.'6 Moreover, at least one federal appellate case has held
that state court proceedings may be enjoined before their commencement
despite the mandate of section 2283.17
The effect of the injunction in the present case was to make explicit
what had been implicit in the discovery priority order-that relief would
not be granted until both parties had had an opportunity for discovery.
The court could have avoided the prohibition of section 2283 on the ground
that the injunction did no more than clarify and enforce an order which,
as originally issued, prevented the initiation of a state court proceeding.'
8
However, ignoring this tenable approach, the court relied on the ground
that it had not in fact stayed a state court proceeding but had merely
enjoined the use of federal discovery, leaving state court processes otherwise
unrestricted. The terms of the injunction did not prevent plaintiff from
bringing a state action supported with evidence known prior to federal
discovery or learned later without the use of federal discovery.'9 The
court did not assert that any injunction, regardless of its purpose, which
does not expressly stay a state court proceeding falls beyond the prohibition
of section 2283 but justified its injunction on the independent ground that
it is incumbent on a federal court to prevent the inequitable use of federal
discovery. Before this holding, a prospective state court plaintiff who had
federal jurisdiction available could have exploited federal discovery proc-
esses by bringing a federal action, completing discovery, and then institut-
16 Beard v. New York Cent. R.R., 20 F.R.D. 607 (N.D. Ohio 1957) ; Snap Lite
Corp. v. Stewart Warner Corp., 40 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Finkelstein v.
Boylan, 33 F. Supp. 657 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); Bachrach v. General Inv. Corp., 31 F.
Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). The courts have made it clear, however, that "it is no
objection to the [discovery] examination that the deposition may be used in some
other action or proceeding, if it is relevant to the pending federal action." In the
Matter of American Anthracite & Bituminous Coal Corp., 22 F.R.D. 504, 508 (E.D.
N.Y. 1958) ; De Seversky v. Republic Aviation Corp., 2 F.R.D. 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
These decisions have been based on an inference that rule 26 (a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure authorizes the use of discovered information only in the action in
which it was obtained and on rule 30(b) which permits the court to make any "order
which justice requires to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment,
or oppression." The disjunctive language of rule 26(a) suggests that that rule, at
least, does not support the reliance placed upon it.
17 American Houses, Inc. v. Schneider, 211 F.2d 881 (3d Cir. 1954). The court
reasoned that if such an injunction were prohibited, "a federal court could never
effectively enjoin a defendant in any matter within the concurrent jurisdiction of
national and state courts." Id. at 885. While the Schneider court talks in terms of
priority of institution of the federal or state actions, the opinion suggests that no state
judicial proceeding had been initiated at the time the injunction issued. Ibid.; cf. note
3 supra. Federal courts have traditionally recognized the power to enjoin state officers
from enforcing unconstitutional state laws or administrative orders. Sterling v. Con-
stantin, 287 U.S. 378, 393 (1932); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 37-38 (1915); Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 161-62 (1908). This power comports with the broad con-
struction given the predecessor of § 2283, § 265 of the Judicial Code of 1911, Act of
March 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1162. "[S]tay of 'proceedings in any court of a
State' . . . is comprehensive. It includes all steps taken or which may be taken in
the state court or by its officers from the institution to the close of the final process."
Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393, 403 (1935).
Is See note 17 mtpra and accompanying text.
19 See note 1 supra.
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ing the state court action. While proceeding in this order would not lessen
the "annoyance, embarrasment, or oppression" 20 of the defendant, it would
have left the federal court with no means of preventing the use by plaintiff
of the information learned through federal discovery. If courts in future
cases regard this tactic as an inequitable use of federal discovery, an in-
junction could issue on the authority of the present case. Though the
presence of a priority order could be used to distinguish it,2 1 a broader
reading 22 of the present case seems more consonant with previous federal
policy against allowing a federal court to be used as an "auxiliary forum"
of a state court for purposes of discovery.
23
The alternative basis for the court's decision in the present case-
that even if the district court were enjoining a state court action, it was
justified in doing so to protect its own "judgment"---extends the third
exception in section 2283 beyond prior holdings. The court, in support ot
its inclusion of interlocutory orders within the meaning of the statutory
term "judgments," stated that "the policies which impelled Congress to
enact 28 U.S.C. § 2283 in order to overrule Toucey v. New York Life
Insurance Co. . . apply to interlocutory as well as to final decrees." 2
Though these policies have not been congressionally articulated, the dissent
to Toucey, in discussing the need for such an exception, stressed the fact
that unless the federal courts had the power to enjoin state relitigation of
their judgments, the holders of such judgments, obtained after great ex-
pense in time and money, would be forced to rely solely on res judicata in
a state court which was unfamiliar with the record of the case.25  These
considerations gain added importance from the fact that today, should the
res judicata defense be rejected by the state court, recourse to a federal
court could be had only by a Supreme Court grant of certiorari,2 6 which
might well be denied for reasons unrelated to the merits of the case.
27
2 0 F. R. Civ. P. 30(b) ; see note 16 srupra.
21 The court in the present case relied heavily on the existence of the discovery
priority order in reaching its decision that plaintiff was making an inequitable use of
federal discovery. Instant case at 248-49. It is quite possible that the court would
have lifted its injunction when the inequality created by the priority order had been
removed-when defendants had completed their discovery.
22 A possible intermediate view would be that the present case authorizes injunc-
tions, even when there is no priority order, to issue only if defendant has not had a
reasonable opportunity for discovery and to lapse as soon as he has had that opportunity.
23 Beard v. New York Cent. R.R., 20 F.R.D. 607, 610 (N.D. Ohio 1957) ; see
cases cited note 16 supra. But cf. Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.
1949). In this case the court affirmed a federal court's stay of its proceedings granted
on grounds unrelated to discovery but on the condition that, in a pending state action,
defendant provide plaintiff with as much information as plaintiff would have gained
in the federal proceeding. This holding would appear to leave the federal court with
the sole function of aiding discovery in a state court. Id. at 309 (dissenting opinion).
24 Instant case at 249.
25 Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 144 (1941) (dissenting
opinion).
2628 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1958); cf. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 167 (1938).
2 7 See Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950) (Frank-
furter, J.).
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Moreover, the holder of a federal interlocutory order does not have even
the defense of res judicata2 8 and, therefore, an injunction to protect an
interlocutory order would seem more necessary than an injunction to pro-
tect a final judgment. On the other hand, since an interlocutory order is
usually obtained after the expenditure of less time and money and is subject
to change through reconsideration or an adverse final judgment,29 a party
who, at the hands of a state court, loses the benefits of an interlocutory
order would seem to have lost less than a party who is deprived of a final
judgment. The question of whether a federal interlocutory order requires
injunctive protection cannot be answered solely on the basis of the interests
of its holder. Factors relating to the nature of the particular order in
question are also highly relevant. The interlocutory decree is limited in
its application to the court which granted it; by its very nature it cannot
be nullified by another court and thus it is in no need of protection. But
the order in the present case was an exercise of the federal court's power 30
to create a temporary imbalance of advantage. It carried with it the as-
sumption that this imbalance would not be unfairly exploited in any court.
Its application extended beyond the bounds of the federal court and created
the threat of state court nullification. When nullification of a federal inter-
locutory order would result in an inequitable use of federal power, the
third exception in section 2283 should authorize an injunction to protect
that order.
Whether the injunction sustained in the present case is viewed merely
as running to the use in state courts of information discovered in federal
court under an order granting priority of discovery or as embodying,
through this restriction, an actual prohibition of the state proceedings, it
is clear that the court of appeals upheld it on the ground that the particular
facts of the case would have made the state court's use of the information
obtained through federal discovery an abuse of the federal forum. But,
whereas the court's refusal to approve all injunctions which do not in form
directly prohibit state proceedings comports with the narrow reading which
the Supreme Court has held must be given section 2283, the language of the
court permitting the prohibition of state actions in order to protect federal
court interlocutory orders may be interpreted in future suits to permit
injunctions which Congress clearly intended to prohibit.
2
8 G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield & Ogilvie, 241 U.S. 22, 28 (1916) ; Coffman
v. Federal Labs., Inc., 171 F.2d 94, 96-98 (3d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 913
(1949) ; United States v. One 1946 Plymouth Sedan Automobile, 167 F2d 3, 8-9
(7th Cir. 1948).
2 9 Cf. Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of America v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 47
(1943) ; John Simmons Co. v. Grier Bros. Co., 258 U.S. 82, 88 (1922).
30 The court's appointment of a master who upheld a subpoena duces tecini
against a corporation organized by defendants and refused to limit the scope of
plaintiff's depositions, instant case at 250, indicates that the court played a positive
role in the discovery process.
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JUDICIAL REVIEW-SuPREME COURT WILL NOT DECIDE
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION RAISED ON APPEAL WH:EN RECORD
Is UNCLEAR
By order of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, all practicing attorneys
are required to be members of the state bar.' Appellant attorney paid
the required dues under protest and then sued in a state court to recover
them, asserting a denial of freedom of association through compulsory
membership in the bar and of free speech in that the bar was spending his
dues to support legislation which he opposed. The court sustained a
demurrer to the complaint and dismissed without leave to amend.2 The
United States Supreme Court affirmed on the grounds that appellant had
not been denied his freedom of association 3 and that the free speech issue
should not be decided because the record-in the opinion of a plurality of
the Court 4---did not present all the facts which might be relevant to its deci-
sion. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
Out of respect for the separation of powers established by the Con-
stitution between the states and the federal government and among the
various branches of the federal government, the Supreme Court has fol-
lowed a policy of avoiding constitutional decisions unless absolutely neces-
sary to a proper disposition of the case before it.5 To effectuate this policy
the Court has developed a number of rules of self-restraint which re-
quire that, whenever possible, decisions be based on grounds other than
constitutional issues.6 In the instant case the Court invoked a recently
developed and apparently similar doctrine that when there is no alternative
ground for decision, but the record fails to present the constitutional issues
in sufficiently "clear-cut and concrete form" to allow the development of
sound constitutional principles, the Court will decline to exercise its juris-
diction to decide the case.7 The Court has treated this doctrine as emanat-
1 n re Integration of Bar, 5 Wis. 2d 618, 93 N.W.2d 601 (1958); In re Inte-
gration of Bar, 273 Wis. 281, 77 N.W.2d 602 (1956); State Bar Rule 2, 273 Wis.
xi-xiii (1956).
2 Lathrop v. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N.W.2d 404 (1960).
sLathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961). The Court considered Railway
Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956), controlling on this point. See
Lathrop v. Donohue, supra at 828, 842; id. at 849 (Harlan, J., concurring). Mr.
Justice Douglas dissented, distinguishing Hanson. Id. at 879, 884.
4 Chief Justice Warren and Justices Clark and Stewart joined in an opinion by
Justice Brennan to hold that the record presented "no sound basis" for deciding the
free speech issue. Id. at 845. Of the Justices who expressly reached the merits of
this issue, Justices Harlan and Frankfurter found integration constitutional, id. at 848,
while Justices Black, id. at 865, and Douglas, id. at 877, thought it unconstitutional. Mr.
Justice Whittaker, concurring in the result, did not articulate whether he thought the
free speech issue was properly posed for decision, merely saying that the case did not
present a violation of "any provision of the United States Constitution." Id. at 865.
5 See, e.g., Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 571 (1947) ; United
States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 124-26 (1948) (concurring opinion).
6 For a list of these rules, see Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion in Ashwander v.
TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936).
7 See United- States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 589-92 (1957); Rescue Army v.
Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-75, 584 (1947). This rule has been invoked most
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ing from the same policy as the avoidance rules.8 But the fact that the
instant case was not one of those which Congress has given the Court dis-
cretion not to review-the case properly came to the Court on appeal 0-
suggests that the application of the doctrine in the instant case should be
scrutinized.
Even if a case is within the mandatory jurisdiction of the Court, the
grounds on which it may be decided are not limited; a decision on one
ground rather than another does not violate the statutory mandate to decide
the case. Thus, a decision may be based on procedural grounds rather
than on the substantive merits of the case.'0  However, if a refusal to
decide the case on its merits is not based on some procedural requirement
implicit in the statute regulating the Court's jurisdiction, it must either find
support in some constitutional limitation on the Court's jurisdiction or be
criticized as a denial of a federal substantive right conferred by the appeals
statute. It could be that since neither the appellant's notice of appeal nor
oral argument on his behalf stated the causes to which he was opposed
which the bar supported with his money,". dismissal was based on the rule
that the Court will not pass upon any questions not raised by the notice
of appeal 12 or expressly argued before the Court.18 But if this is the ex-
planation for the Court's refusal to decide the free speech issue, it is sur-
prising that the Court's opinion did not even allude to these well-known
procedural requirements. More likely the Court's disposition reflects a
conception of its limited constitutional power. The Court cannot decide
a federal question in the abstract; the Constitution requires that the ques-
frequently in cases arising upon the pleadings, where the benefit of detailed facts which
might be elicited upon a trial is lacking. See, e.g., United States v. UAW, supra;
United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947). The present case arose substantially
upon the pleadings, but the record did contain some facts which had been judicially
noticed by the lower court. The usual disposition of a case in which the doctrine
has been invoked is dismissal. See, e.g., Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. Grimes, 364
U.S. 290 (1960) (per curiam) ; International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Denver Milk
Producers, 334 U.S. 809 (1948). However, dismissal is not required, since the Court
has power to "vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court
lawfully brought before it for review, and . . . remand the cause and . . . require
such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2106 (1958). In Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), motion to recall or amend
mandate denied, 350 U.S. 985 (1956), the Court remanded the case for specific infor-
mation thought necessary to decide the question involved. See Villa v. Van Schaick,
299 U.S. 152 (1936). For an interesting view as to the propriety of dismissals on
appeal because of an inadequate record see Frank, The United States Suprenme Court:
1947-48, 16 U. CaL L. REv. 1, 35-36 (1948), in which the author contends that such
dispositions deny parties their right to an appeal granted them by congressional statute.
In the instant case, Justice Black was of the opinion that if the Court was unwilling
to decide the free speech issue, it should at least remand for amendment to the pleadings
instead of affirming a dismissal without leave to amend. Instant case at 868-69.
8 See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 573 (1947).
9 See instant case at 824-27.
3o New York ex rel. Rosevale Realty Co. v. Kleinert, 268 U.S. 646 (1925) ; cf.
Slagle v. Ohio, 366 U.S. 259 (1961); City of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., 358 U.S. 639 (1959) (per curiam).
1 Instant case at 827-28 n.4.
12U.S. Sup. CT. R. 10(2) (c).
Is See New York ex rel. Rosevale Realty Co. v. Kleinert, 268 U.S. 646, 651
(1995).
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tioxi be presented in the context of a "case" or "controversy" and that its
decision be an exercise of the Court's "judicial power." 14 The present
action undoubtedly presented a case or controversy: it was a matter of
judicial notice that the bar had expended dues money exacted from the
appellant to influence legislation, and, in his sworn complaint, appellant
alleged that he opposed some of the legislation which the bar had pro-
moted.15 Moreover, the authorities upon which the plurality relied for its
refusal to decide the free speech issue make it clear that it was not the
"case or controversy" requirement upon which their refusal was based.16
Thus, the refusal would seem to require support from the concept of
"judicial power" as reflected in Supreme Court jurisprudence. This con-
cept includes the notion that it is not a proper function of the Court to reach
a judgment on the merits of a case without having a chance to give due
weight and consideration to all of the facts which can be made available
and which might be relevant to, the issues posed for decision, for only then
is a "correct" decision most likely to be forthcoming. 17  Obviously any
14 U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
15 Instant case at 846; id. at 870 (Black, J., dissenting). The plurality conceded
that it was proper to consider the expanded record which included facts judicially
noticed by the state court. Id. at 823. But see id. at 847; note 20 infra.
10 Thus, in United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957), the remand to a federal
district court for trial necessarily implied the existence of a case or controversy. In
United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 126 (1948) (concurring opinion), the Court was
said not to be confronted with "a case of mootness with its technical meaning of a
non-existent controversy."
17 Thus, the statute permitting certification of questions from courts of appeals,
28 U.S.C. § 1254(3) (1958), and that permitting like certification from the Court of
Claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1255(2) (1958), and their statutory predecessors were meant to
invoke the obligatory jurisdiction of the Court-as was the appeals statute-, yet the
Court has refused to answer certified questions when they were not appropriately
framed. Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W. I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 571-73 (1939);
Lowden v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 298 U.S. 160 (1936); Chicago,
B. & Q. Ry. v. Williams, 205 U.S. 444 (1907) (question brings up entire case);
Graver v. Faurot, 162 U.S. 435 (1896); United States v. Hall, 131 U.S. 50 (1889)
(not clear and distinct propositions of law); United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55
(1914) (dictum). While the refusal to answer certified questions has in a sense
been based on statutory construction-as the instant case may have been-it seems
fair to conclude that the Court read the legislative purpose in terms of its own juris-
prudence and ultimately of the judicial power itself. Again, the Court has permitted
"abstention" in the face of statutory federal court jurisdiction, preferring the values
of federalism over strict construction of the jurisdictional statute. E.g., Harrison v.
NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959) (federal question); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v.
City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959) (diversity). Both the certification and the
abstention cases may be distinguished from the present case in that in none of them has
a party been denied his ultimate right to a Supreme Court hearing. Clearly, the certifi-
cation cases concern his rights in inferior federal courts; the parties neither lose
nor gain a right of appeal on the basis of the refusal to answer the certified questions.
Nor has the Court permitted the use of abstention except in cases in which there would
be appeal from a decision of the highest state court. See Lassiter v. Northampton
County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959). Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in part
in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46, 54 (1948), suggested that it was the func-
tion of the federal trial judge to elicit the facts necessary for him to reach a "correct!'
decision; the adversary system may not be enough to assure the integrity of judicial
determinations. But if Justice Frankfurter's views on the judicial process were to be
read into the constitutional outlines of the "judicial power," Supreme Court juris-
prudence, or the interpretation of the judicial Code, they would seem to require that
the present case be remanded for further findings of fact and not affirmed with the
free speech issue "reserved."
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decisionmaldng organ of government should strive to ensure the greatest
degree of "correctness" of its decisions. But in the case of legislative or
executive decisions, this desideratum is not conceived as a limitation on the
power to decide. Despite the normal operation of the adversary system,
perhaps such a limitation may be proper in certain areas in the case of the
federal judiciary. Historically, the judicial function has been concerned
with more than fairness to the parties in a particular lawsuit since, under
the common-law doctrine of stare decisis, a particular decision serves to
guide others in ordering their future conduct and even affects the outcome
of future litigation. Furthermore, the constitutional allocation of powers
requires that the Court, which is not subject to review by any other gov-
ernmental body, carefully stay within its own powers and not encroach
upon powers vested in other organs of government.1 s The Court's "policy"
of refusing to decide constitutional issues which are not clearly presented
may, in reality, be a constitutional requirement implicit in the concept of
judicial power which is applicable even in cases which reach the Court on
appeal.
In the present case, the plurality explained that it would not decide
whether appellant had been denied his right to free speech when he was
forced to contribute to a bar which engaged in political activities to which
he was opposed 19 because the record was inadequate to indicate the nature
of the particular legislation as to which he and the bar disagreed.
20
Whether this additional information would be needed for a proper decision
of the free speech issue necessarily depends upon the Court's conception of
the first amendment guarantee. It might hold that there was no denial
18 See, e.g., Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S.
(7 How.) 1 (1849).
1 9 The Court recognized that appellant had at least presented it with the con-
tention that he had "the right to be free from compelled financial support of the organi-
zation because of its political activities," whether he agreed or disagreed with its
positions. Instant case at 847. The Court's failure to decide the merits of this con-
tention may be taken as a decision, sub silentio, that agreement with the positions
taken by the bar renders moot one's objections to having the bar spend his money to
promote these positions.
20 Other defects in the record in the present case specified by the plurality were that
it did not show: (1) "the way in which and the degree to which funds compulsorily
exacted from . . . [the bar's] members are used to support the organization's politi-
cal activities," (2) "how political expenditures are financed and how much has been
expended for political causes to which appellant objects," and (3) "what portions of
the expenditure of funds to propagate the State Bar's views may be properly appor-
tioned to his dues payments." Instant case at 846. The plurality also deemed the
free speech issue to be "no more concretely presented for adjudication than it was in
[Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956)] . . . ." Instant case at
845. In Hanson railroad employees brought suit to enjoin enforcement of a union shop
agreement which would require them to become members of the union. Although there
was evidence in the record that the union engaged in activities to influence legislation,
see instant case at 843, the case is distinguishable from the present case in that the
former lacked a justiciable case or controversy in regard to the free speech issue The
plaintiffs did not allege that the union spent or was going to spend money exacted
from them for purposes to which they were opposed, see International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 786 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting), nor could they
have, as they were not members of the union at the time of suit, and the attacked
union shop agreement had not yet been put into effect. See Railway Employes' Dep't
v. Hanson, supra at 227.
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of free speech because the connection between the payment of dues and the
expenditures for purposes to which the appellant was opposed was so
remote that he was in no way identified with any opinions expressed by
the bar.2 1 At the other extreme, it might hold that requiring financial sup-
port of causes to which one is opposed differs so slightly from requiring one
to speak out in favor of these causes that free speech is denied in both
cases.2 2 Whichever of these viewpoints is taken, no additional facts would
change the decision. However, if the plurality was employing a "bal-
ancing" approachn-if, when some degree of infringement is found to
exist, it would weigh the interests of the individual and those of the public
to determine whether, on balance, there is a public need sufficient to justify
the infringement-more facts might be needed. A state might reasonably
find it to be in the public interest that the composite opinion of all mem-
bers of the bar on various legal matters should be publicized.24 The public
interest in obtaining such an opinion would vary directly with the degree of
expertise which lawyers in general possess on the matters upon which the
bar would be called to pass judgment. Presumably, lawyers would be
especially expert on matters requiring the kind of technical legal knowl-
edge which is peculiar to the legal profession, but not on matters of broad
legislative policy calling primarily for social and economic judgments.2 5
Under such an approach the nature of the legislation on which the bar
passes judgment would be the ultimate factor in determining on what side
of the scale the balance lies. Therefore, no decision could be rendered
unless the nature of the supported legislation was known.
Had it been taking such an approach, the plurality would undoubtedly
have been correct in its assertion that knowledge of the nature of the legis-
lative measures in issue is crucial; but it is surprising that it was not
satisfied by the information which was already in the record. The lower
court opinion indicated that all of the legislation supported by the bar was
of a technical, rather than political, nature 2 6 Since all of the measures
21 See instant case at 860 (Harlan, 3., concurring).
22 See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 788 (1961)
(Black, J., dissenting).
2
3See Uphaus v. Wyman, 364 U.S. 388 (1960) ; instant case at 861 (Harlan, 3.,
concurring).
24 Instant case at 862-63 (Harlan, J., concurring).
25 There are even technical matters in substantive legislation as to which the
lawyer may be deemed expert, see Dulles v. Johnson, 273 F.2d 362, 367 (2d Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 834 (1960), and the position has been taken by some
jurists that a lawyer may be considered expert on some substantive issues themselves.
See instant case at 863-64 (Harlan, J., concurring) ; Cardozo, A Ministry of Jistice,
35 HARv. L. Rxv. 113 (1921); MacDonald, Forward to the Symposium, 40 CORNELL
L.Q. 641, 644 (1955).
26 See Lathrop v. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 240-41, 102 N.W.2d 404, 410 (1960).
The Wisconsin court stated that the legislative activities of the bar were similar in
scope to the legislative activities pursued by the voluntary bar associations in Dulles
v. Johnson, 273 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 834 (1960). The
legislative activities in the latter case were "designed to improve court procedure or
to clarify some technical matter of substantive law. They [were] . . . not intended
for the economic aggrandizement of a particular group or to promote some larger
principle of governmental policy." Id. at 367. Moreover, the political activities of
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are indistinguishable in nature, evidence of which particular measures
appellant opposed is irrelevant-the constitutional decision would seem to
be the same in any case. The plurality's objection that the record did not
indicate the manner in which nor the degree to which the bar has spent its
money for political purposes opposed by the appellant2 7 suggests a con-
stitutional distinction between an integrated bar created for the sole purpose
of influencing legislation, which spends all of its money in pursuance of this
one activity and one in which such activities are only incidental to other
functions. Even if such a distinction is well founded, the record in the
instant case clearly indicated that the bar's political activities were only
incidental functions.2 8 Thus, there seems to be no basis in fact for the
plurality's refusal to decide the free speech issue in the present case.
2 9
the Wisconsin State Bar are restricted by law to matters dealing with court reform,
legal practice, and the administration of justice. See Lathrop v. Donohue, supra at
239, 102 N.W.2d at 409. Although these categories might be given a broad inter-
pretation to encompass matters of substantive law or even the support of candidates
for judicial office, it can be inferred from the Wisconsin court's original concern with
the problems which might be posed by the bar's political activities that the court
intended to limit these activities to procedural matters. See instant case at 845 n.17;
In re Integration of the Bar, 249 Wis. 523, 529-30, 25 N.W.2d 500, 502-03 (1946):
There are a group of activities, however, for which we think the inte-
grated bar could not use its dues. . . . It could not use its dues for any
purpose advantageous to its members that did not also further the good of
the general public. . . . The funds ought not to be used in judicial cam-
paigns although members of the bar can properly act in this field.. . . The
bar ought to have the untrammeled power of acting in unison to consider any
matter close to the administration of justice in which the members have special
competency ....
27 See note 20 supra.
28 The plurality's opinion that the bar did not violate appellant's freedom of
association rests expressly on a finding that the political activities of the bar were
minor and incidental to the organization's primary functions. See instant case at 839,
842-43. It appears that very little of the bar's total financial resources was spent for
political purposes: Of a total income of approximately $90,000 (of which $80,000 was
derived from dues), see instant case at 846, only $1,400-for lobbying expenses--was
spent on political activities, see instant case at 836. Although there could very well
have been other financial expenditures for political purposes which were not listed in
the record, it might be a proper subject for judicial notice that most activities of a
bar association are carried on by its members voluntarily and without compensation.
The fact that the bar in the present case carried on many nonpolitical activities which
obviously required substantial amounts of money should negate any suspicion that a
great deal of the organization's money was spent for political purposes.
29 The other defects which the plurality found in the record in the present case,
see note 20 ntpra, are unrelated to the merits of the constitutional issue of free speech.
They relate only to detailed proof of the allegations of the complaint or to determining
the measure of damages, if there would be any. Compare International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961), decided the same day as the present case,
in which the Court held that it was a violation of § 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor
Act, 64 Stat 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1958), which permits union shop agree-
ments with interstate railroads, for the union to spend dues exacted by compulsion
from a member for political activities to which the member is opposed. By so con-
struing the statute the Court was able to avoid the constitutional question left un-
resolved in the present case. There is some question whether the Court was justified
in giving the statute such an interpretation or whether it forced the interpretation to
avoid determination of the constitutional question posed for decision. See id. at 784
(Black, J., dissenting); id. at 799-800 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Even if there
were any basis for doubt that all of the legislative measures involved in the present
case were of a technical nature, a more just result might have been achieved by remand
for further clarification or amendment of the complaint rather than affirmance of the
state court decision. See note 7 .tpra. Affirmance of the lower court's decision may
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Where the record is truly inadequate to allow proper consideration of the
constitutional issue posed for decision, the Court may well be constitu-
tionally prohibited from deciding it.5 0 However, the present case illus-
trates the danger that this limitation may be invoked all too readily in
cases involving subtle questions.5 ' By declining to decide the free speech
issue in the instant case, the plurality seems to have ignored the congres-
sional mandate that in certain classes of cases--of which this is one-a
party is not to be denied access to the Court. This access becomes mean-
ingless when the Court disposes of a case in such a way that the appellant
is deprived of his right to demand an eventual decision on the merits.
LICENSES-LQUOR LICENSE DENTAL BASED ON PRIoR Co-wIC-
Tio M o E TA.&wi THIE " YEARS OLD HELD UNJUSTIFIED ON
ANALOGY TO STATUTORY PROVISION CONCERNING REAPPLICATION
FOR LOST LICENSE
Appellant Parenti asked the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board to
approve a transfer to him of all capital stock in a corporation holding a
restaurant liquor license. The state's Liquor Code ' requires that a person
seeking a license for the first time show, inter alia, that he is "a person of
good repute." 2 After a hearing the Board denied Parenti's application on
the ground that, regardless of his reputation at the time of the hearing, his
result in the present case being res judicata should appellant bring another suit to
adjudicate the free speech issue. Such a result seems unjust in view of the fact that
the plurality's refusal to decide the question leaves open the possibility that appellant
might be able to draw an adequate complaint and have his claim sustained. See instant
case at 870 (Black, J., dissenting). The disposition seems particularly harsh in that
the case arose on the pleadings and the appellant would have had an opportunity to
amend his complaint but for an error of the lower court. See Reque v. Milwaukee
& Suburban Transp. Corp., 7 Wis. 2d 111, 114, 95 N.W.2d 752, 754, rehearing denied,
7 Wis. 2d 114a, 97 N.W.2d 182 (1959); Cross v. Leuenberger, 267 Wis. 232, 65
N.W.2d 35, rehearing denied, 267 Wis. 238a, 66 N.W.2d 168 (1954). Appellant was
given an opportunity to supply some missing information on oral argument before
the Supreme Court, but refused to do so, see instant case at 847; perhaps this should
be considered sufficient to guarantee fairness. Nevertheless, because the issue posed
was one of free speech, appellant's refusal to state the particular legislative measures
to which he was opposed may be taken as an attempt to retain maximum protection
of his constitutional right rather than an attempt to attack the constitutionality of
the bar on a broader ground than necessary.
so Or the Court may be justified in interpreting the appeal statute to avoid this
constitutional question. See note 17 supra.
31 See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), notion to recall or amend imandate
denied,'350 U.S. 985 (1956).
1 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §§ 1-101 to 9-902 (1952), as amended, §§ 1-102 to 8-802
(Supp. 1960).
2
PA. STAT. ANN. tit 47, § 4-404 (Supp. 1960). Transfers of liquor licenses are
regulated by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §4-468 (Supp. 1960), which states that "no
transfer shall be made to a person who would not have been eligible to receive the
license originally . . . ." Moreover, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §4-437(c) (1952)
states that "licenses shall be granted by the board only to reputable individuals, or to
associations, partnerships and corporations whose members or officers and directors
are reputable individuals." Had there been a transfer to appellant without approval
of the Board and had it later been discovered that appellant was not a person of good
reputation, the Board could have revoked the corporation's license on the ground
that its sole stockholder was not a reputable individual. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47,
§ 4-471 (1952).
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1957 conviction for lottery, pool selling, and bookmaking conclusively dis-
qualify him from holding a license.8 After a hearing de novo, the Court
of Quarter Sessions of Lehigh County found as a fact that Parenti was
presently a person of good repute and held that a conviction occurring
more than three years before his application did not, in the absence of other
evidence of bad reputation, disqualify him under the Liquor Code from
becoming the owner of a licensed corporation. The Board was therefore
ordered to approve the stock transfer. Parenti License, 25 Pa. D. & C.2d
109 (Quarter Sess. 1961).
Because it is generally believed that a tavern can easily become asso-
dated with crime,4 state legislatures have considered freedom from criminal
influence and a high level of character essential in a tavern owner. Most
states have effectuated this policy by a comprehensive program of licensing.5
One approach is to make a past conviction a bar 6 -sometimes permanent 7
-to obtaining a license. Another is to require that the holder of a license
be a person of "good repute" in the community." Occasionally these ap-
proaches are taken concurrently.9 The Pennsylvania Liquor Code adopts
the standard of "good repute," "0 but is silent as to what effect should be
given to a prior criminal conviction. The Liquor Control Board, reviewed
by the courts of quarter sessions,"1 has been left to supply the standard.
There has been apparent agreement between Board and courts that a
"recent" conviction provides overwhelming evidence of present bad reputa-
tion,'2 but the courts have refused to acquiesce in the Board's contention
that a conviction remote in time proves equally that an applicant is un-
qualified to hold a license. 13  However, the vagueness of the criteria "re-
3 Any applicant for a new license, or for renewal or transfer of an existing
license has a right to a hearing before the Board after an initial adverse decision
on his application. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-464 (1952).
4 See CHILDS, LIQUOR UNDER CONTROL 104 (1961); CHILDS, MAKING REPEAL
WORK 110-11 (1947); HARRISON & LAiNE, AFTER REPEAL 79-81 (1936); Gaynor,
Indirect Control of Organiged Crime Through Liquor License Procedure, 49 J. CRIm.
L., C. & P.S. 65, 67 (1958): "[E]ven where the licensee is not himself a criminal,
the fact that he has a reputation for criminal activity might attract violators to
his door."
5 See Gaynor, sipra note 4, at 67; cf. JOINT COMA. OF T.HE STATES TO STUDY
ALCoHoLIc BEvERAGE LAws, ALCOIrOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL 37 (1960); CInDS,
MAKING REPEAL WORK 110-11 (1947).
6E.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4-202D (Supp. 1961) (felony within five years
involving moral turpitude); CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 30-45 (1960) (felony); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 561.15(2) (Supp. 1960) (enumerated offenses).
7 See, e.g., ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 120 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1960) (enumerated
offenses); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-25 (Supp. 1961) (crime involving moral tur-
pitude).
s ArA. CODE tit. 29, § 15 (1958); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-404 (Supp. 1960).
9 See, e.g., TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 666-11(1), (5) (1952).
10 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-404 (Supp. 1960).
11 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-464 (1952) provides that upon the refusal of the
Board to approve a transfer, the court of quarter sessions may on its own motion
or at the request of an applicant hear an appeal de novo.
12 See, e.g., Appeal of Shank, 67 York 13 (Pa. Quarter Sess. 1953) (three
months); Hirsch's Liquor License Appeal, 29 Northam. 253 (Pa. Quarter Sess.
1944) (two years).
13 See, e.g., Bagshaw Liquor License Case, 2 Bucks 131 (Pa. Quarter Sess.
1952) (conviction 16 years before) ; Appeal of Marraccini, 20 Wash. 40 (Pa. Quar-
ter Sess. 1939) (convictions 11 and 12 years before). The Liquor Control Board,
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cent" and "remote" 14 has permitted the Board considerable leeway, and
that body has shown a disposition to read into the liquor statute a perma-
nent bar to applicants convicted of a crime.15 By contrast, section 4-471 of
the Liquor Code 16 provides that a license may be revoked for violation of
the liquor laws, or "upon any other sufficient cause shown," and places
upon the former licensee a disability of three years before he can seek
another license.17  In Appeal of Balliet,18 the applicant-never before a
licensee-had been denied a license by the Board because of a violation of
the liquor laws more than three years before. On appeal, the court, finding
no reason to distinguish this case from that of a former licensee who had
lost his license for violation of the liquor laws, 19 adopted by analogy the
three-year limit on disability found in section 4-471.20 Since conviction
of a licensee for a violation outside the area of liquor control has also been
held to be a cause for revoking his license within the phrase "other sufficient
cause" in section 4-471,21 the court in the present case similarly saw no
reason to distinguish between a former licensee with a prior nonliquor
conviction and the appellant Parenti,22 and it too adopted the three-year
limit2 3
The issue before the court in the present case required it to take into
account both the unquestioned effect of a conviction upon the would-be
licensee's reputation and the possibility that that reputation can be refur-
bished. Rather than adopt a specific time period during which a conviction
would serve as a bar, the court could have limited the effect of prior con-
victions to a "reasonable" time, permitting the development of the outlines
of "reasonableness" through case-by-case definition.2 4  While this would
have been more consistent with traditional ideas about the judicial func-
pursuant to its power to issue regulations under the Liquor Control Act of 1933,
ruled that "no person shall be considered to be of good reputation who has been
convicted of crime within 3 years prior to the date of application." Rath v. Penn-
sylvania Liquor Control Board, 20 Pa. D. & C. 696 (Quarter Sess. 1934). No
similar regulation has been promulgated under the Board's rulemaking powers granted
in the present Code.
14 Compare In re Refusal of Liquor License-Raggi, 17 Wash. 104 (Pa. Quar-
ter Sess. 1935) (three years since last conviction not long enough to reestablish good
reputation), with Appeal of Marraccini, 20 Wash. 40 (Pa. Quarter Sess. 1939)
(applicant's activities in illegal liquor traffic eleven years prior to application had no
effect on present good repute).
15 See instant case at 111; Bagshaw Liquor License Case, 2 Bucks 131, 141-42
(Pa. Quarter Sess. 1952).
16PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-471 (1952).
17 Ibid.
18 22 Leh. 444 (Pa. Quarter Sess. 1947) ; see It re Refusal of Liquor License-
Raggi, 17 Wash. 104 (Pa. Quarter Sess. 1935) (dictum); cf. Zeamer's License
Appeal, 50 Lanc. 427 (Pa. Quarter Sess. 1947).
19 See 22 Leh. at 446.
2 0 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-471 (1952).
21 IBPOE Liquor License Case, 163 Pa. Super. 395, 62 A.2d 68 (1948); Com-
monwealth v. Lyons, 142 Pa. Super. 54, 15 A.2d 851 (1940).
22 See instant case at 114.
23 The same court earlier affirmed the denial of a license to Parenti on the ground
that three years had not elapsed since his 1957 conviction. Parenti Appeal, 21 Pa.
D. & C.2d 506 (Quarter Sess. 1960).2
4 Cf. Suchan v. Swope, 357 Pa. 16, 21, 53 A.2d 116, 119 (1947) (reasonable
time applied in contract law).
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tion,25 sound modern judicial process supports the approach taken by the
court in the instant case.26 Since the legislature had weighed the sociologi-
cal, psychological, and other factors which it believed important in deter-
mining the weight to be given to prior convictions in license application
cases in an analogous area, the court quite properly applied the legislative
judgment in the present case, once it had determined that there was no
reason to reach a result in this case different from the result in the area
with which the legislature had dealt. For an act of the legislature reflects
the commonwealth's policy on prior convictions as fully as would a Penn-
sylvania precedent.27 Nor does the imposition of a specific period during
which prior convictions will absolutely bar the grant of a liquor license-
in contrast to a "reasonable" period-impose an additional, nonstatutory
penalty upon criminal convictions, since the adoption of the legislatively
chosen period in an analogous area serves merely to incorporate a legisla-
tive standard of "reasonableness" into the determination of the effect of
prior convictions. Denials of licenses based on this legislative standard
will still comport with the requirement of "good repute" rather than with
a court-imposed additional penalty for prior crimes.
28
TORTS-SUPERINTENDENT Or oux y HosPrIAL HiE LIABLE
FOR SUICIDE Or PATIENT oN ALTERxATIVE THEo S or P soxA
NEGLIGENCE AND RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
The family of the deceased brought her as a paying patient to the
county hospital in Pierce County, Washington, shortly after she had at-
tempted suicide; I after admission, she was left unattended long enough to
permit her to strangle herself with plastic tubing used for intravenous
feeding. Her personal representatives brought an action for damages
against the county, the hospital's board of trustees, and appellant, super-
2 5 Cf. Fischbach & Moore, Inc. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 198
F. Supp. 911, 915 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
26 See Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L. REV. 383, 385, 406
(1908).
27 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Mays, 401 Pa. 413, 418, 164 A.2d 656, 659 (1960)
(overriding policy of the legislature is evidenced in Fair Trade Act).28 Although the opinion in the present case contains language suggesting that
the holding may be limited to minor criminal offenses, instant case at 114, the rea-
soning on which the court relies would support its application to all criminal offenders
regardless of the seriousness of their crimes. The statutory authority on which the
present decision is based makes no such distinction, nor can it be reasonably in-
ferred therefrom. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-471 (1952). It does, however, seem
proper to begin the three-year period at the time of release from prison rather than
the time of conviction, hence assuring three years in which the applicant will have
time to reestablish his reputation. See Appeal of Shank, 67 York 13, 16 (Pa. Quar-
ter Sess. 1953). Nevertheless, it must be remembered, in evaluating the decision
to adopt the three-year rule by analogy, that the court is not weakening the re-
quirement that the applicant meet his burden of establishing his good reputation.
See Application for Restaurant Liquor License, Hykel, 39 Del. 108 (Pa. Quarter
Sess. 1952).
1 Both the admitting physician and nurse knew that the deceased had been
admitted to the hospital because of an attempted suicide earlier the same day.
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intendent of the hospital. On demurrer the trial judge dismissed the com-
plaint as to the county and the board.2 Trial of the superintendent fol-
lowed at which he was held liable for the suicide, although he had learned
of decedent's presence in the hospital only after her death. The trial judge
denied the superintendent's motion for judgment n.o.v.,8 and the Supreme
Court of Washington, rejecting the superintendent's challenge to instruc-
tions on the duty owed a patient with known suicidal tendencies 4 and the
agency relationship between a superintendent and subordinate hospital em-
ployees,5 affirmed.0 It held that the statutory provision setting forth the
superintendent's duties made him liable for the negligence of his subordi-
nates.7 Kent v. Whitaker, 364 P.2d 556 (Wash. 1961).
It is the general rule that neither public officers nor their bondsmen
are liable for the torts of subordinates, even when the subordinates have
been appointed by the officer.8  The policy underlying this rule was articu-
lated by the United States Supreme Court in Robertson v. Sichel:2 com-
petent persons could not be found to assume positions of public responsi-
bility if they knew they might be held liable for the torts of a large number
of subordinates over whom they had no effcctive control. 10  Under an ex-
ception to this rule vicarious liability has been imposed on sheriffs and
similar peace officers for the torts of their deputies, based on an ancient
fiction that the sheriff and his deputy are one."1 This liability has not been
extended even to a police chief and his subordinates in most jurisdictions,12
and some cases have denied liability although statutes or ordinances ap-
peared to impose it specifically.13 In the Washington case of Pavish v.
2The dismissal was based on the principle that a county is not liable under
respondeat superior for the negligence of statutory officials or their servants who
are not subject to direct control by the county. Brief for Respondents, p. 12, Kent v.
Whitaker, 364 P2d 556 (Wash. 1961).
3 Kent v. Whitaker, Docket No. 139192, Wash. Super. Ct., May 2, 1960.
4 The defendant objected that the instruction placed on him the unrealistic duty
of personally supervising the care of all such patients. Brief for Appellant, pp.
17-24, Kent v. Whitaker, 364 P.2d 556 (Wash. 1961).
GAppellant's objection here was based not on the language of the instruction
itself, but on the premise that the hospital employees were not the superintendent's
personal employees, and, therefore, no agency question existed in the case. Brief for
Appellant, pp. 35-36, Kent v. Whitaker, 364 P.2d 556 (Wash. 1961).
6 Fifteen assignments of error were not considered because of appellant's failure
to follow correct Washington procedure.7 WAsH. REv. CoDE § 36.62.230 (1951).
8 See Wolford, Liability of Public Officers for Acts of Their Subordinates,
Deputies, and Employees, 14 KY. S.B.J. 11 (1949).
0 127 U.S. 507 (1888).
10 Id. at 515.
11 Wolford, supra note 8, at 14.
12 Casey v. Scott, 82 Ark. 362, 101 S.W. 1152 (1907); Michel v. Smith, 188
Cal. 199, 205 Pac. 113 (1922) ; Van Vorce v. Thomas, 18 Cal. App. 2d 723, 64 P.2d
772 (Dist. Ct. App. 1937).
13 Russell v. Glascow, 63 Ariz. 310, 162 P.2d 129 (1945) (construing ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANx. § 38-463 (1956)); Bower v. Davis, 13 Cal. App. 2d 678, 57 P.2d 574
(Dist. Ct. App. 1936). In the Bower case, the court held that respondeat superior
did not apply even though the Los Angeles charter provided that the chief of police
"'shall have, in the discharge of his proper duties, like powers and be subject to
like responsibilities as a sheriff in similar cases."' Cal. Stat., ch. 5, at 1090 (Charter
of Los Angeles, § 201), quoted in 13 Cal. App. 2d at 679, 57 P.2d at 574.
1962]
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Meyers,14 damages were sought from a chief of police for an alleged un-
lawful arrest by one of his policemen subordinates. The state supreme
court distiguished the sheriff-deputy cases, pointing out that the officer
had not acted specifically for his chief but was himself acting as a public
servant. It therefore held that the police chief was not liable and indicated
in dictum that he could be held liable only under an express charter provi-
sion.' 5 In Ulvestad v. Dolphin,'6 however, the same court held a chief of
police liable for the incarceration of an unlawfully arrested person because
the Seattle city charter made him "the keeper of the city prison." 17 This
decision was criticized at the time for imposing liability on a public officer
when his subordinate was appointed and retained under civil service.' s
The opinion in the present case reveals solicitude on the part of the
court for the minor plaintiffs, who would have been without further re-
course had they failed to recover from the superintendent. The trial court
had already dismissed complaints against the county and the board of
trustees, and the hospital, if it was a suable entity,19 would apparently have
escaped liability because of municipal immunity 20 The trial court sup-
ported the verdict for plaintiffs on the alternative grounds of personal
negligence and respondeat superior,21 and the supreme court affirmed in an
opinion which failed to explore the ramifications of either theory 2 2 In a
brief and unilluminating passage, the court concluded that the Ulvestad
case was controlling authority and that Pavish did not apply, basing its
conclusion on the existence of a statute defining the duties of hospital
14 129 Wash. 605, 225 Pac. 633 (1924).
15 Id. at 614, 225 Pac. at 636 (dictum).
16 152 Wash. 580, 278 Pac. 681 (1929).
17 Id. at 585, 278 Pac. at 683.
18 43 HARv. L. Rxv. 327, 328 (1929).
19 "An action may be maintained against a county or other of the public corpora-
tions . . . for an injury to the rights of the plaintiff arising from some act or
omission of such county or other public corporation." WAsH. REv. CoDE § 4.08.120
(Supp. 1956). This statute does not necessarily establish the hospital's amenability
to suit because the statute under which the hospital was set up, WAsH. R:Ev. CODE
§§ 36.62.010-.280 (1951), apparently did not provide for an entity that could be sued.
20There is no liability for negligence of employees engaged in performing
governmental or public duties, Crowley v. City of Raymond, 198 Wash. 432, 88 P.2d
858 (1939), and it is generally held that the maintenance of a hospital by a munici-
pality is a governmental and not a proprietary function. E.g., Gillies v. City of
Minneapolis, 66 F. Supp. 467, 469 (D. Minn. 1946) ; cf. Hagerman v. City of Seattle,
189 Wash. 694, 66 P.2d 1152 (1937). There would be no charitable immunity in a
suit brought by a paying patient. Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp. Ass'n,
43 Wash. 2d 162, 260 P.2d 765 (1953).
21Kent v. Whitaker, No. 139192, Wash. Super. Ct., May 2, 1960.
22Despite the fact that respondent's brief on appeal relied as heavily on the
alleged personal negligence of the superintendent as on his responsibility for the
negligence of subordinates, Brief for Respondents, pp. 15-26, the supreme court did
not adequately address itself to that issue. It was content merely to cite two cases,
Daley v. State, 273 App. Div. 552, 78 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1948), and Stallman v. Robinson,
364 Mo. 275, 260 S.W.2d 743 (1953), as authority for the correctness of the trial
court's instruction on the duty owed a known suicidal patient. In Daley the de-
fendant was the State of New York as proprietor of a state mental institution, and
in Stallman the defendants were doctors who ran a private hospital. The court did
not explain how or whether it equated breach of duty by a hospital with personal
negligence of a superintendent.
RECENT CASES
superintendentsPa The statute in question, however, contained no mandate
that the superintendent be liable for the torts of subordinates, nor does the
statutory language give any suggestion that the legislature considered the
problem of tort liability. The court's reliance on an apparently illusory
legislative intent results in the imposition of a legal duty that has not been
studied or rationalized by either legislature or judiciary. Moreover, lia-
bility based on the sheriff-deputy relationship has occupied a unique posi-
tion in the law, and the policy militating against it has led to its strict
limitation and even elimination.m2 In the light of this trend toward con-
traction of liability, it is doubtful that Ulvestad should have been used to
extend the vicarious liability of public officers into other areas. Although
the most widely accepted rationale of respondeat superior, the "entrepreneur
theory," 2 5 may justify holding the hospital liable in the present case, it
does not support the liability of a defendant who is not in the business of
running a hospital but is only its superintendent. 6 Thus, the agency
ground for the present decision is based on tenuous analogy from a single
precedent and resists explanation in terms of the most common theory ex-
plaining respondeat mperior.
The court would have been on sounder ground if it had approved the
instruction on personal negligence and expressly rejected the trial court's
reliance upon respondeat superior.2 7  A finding of personal negligence on
the facts of the present case finds little support in direct precedent,28 and it
is understandable that the court felt disinclined to rely entirely upon that
ground. However, there may be personal negligence both for failure to
supervise a negligent subordinate -9 and for failure to act when a duty
is owed because of some special relationship8 0  Each of these theories
2 3 Instant case at 559-60, relying on WASH. REV. CODE § 36.62.230 (1951).
2See notes 12-14 supra and accompanying text.
2 5 MECHEM, OUTLINES OF AGENCY § 359 (4th ed. 1952).
2 6 There is no reason to believe that appellant could treat this liability as a cost
of doing business, for, although WASH. REv. CODE § 36.62.210 (1951) provides that
the superintendent "shall furnish a bond in such amount as may be fixed by the board,"
there was no evidence that appellant's bond was large enough to cover this or similar
judgments.
27 It seems unlikely that the Washington court would affirm the decision while
rejecting one of the theories on which the jury may have based its verdict. But see
text accompanying notes 34-35. However, even if the court had felt compelled to
reverse and remand because of its disapproval of one of the theories, this would have
been preferable to the extension of vicarious liability of public officers which could
result from the general application of the reasoning of the present opinion. Although
the delay resulting from reversal and remand might lower the settlement value of
the plaintiffs' case, they would almost surely prevail on a theory of personal negli-
gence were the cause retried.
28But cf. Drefahl v. Connell, 85 Wis. 109, 55 N.W. 160 (1893).
29 See, e.g., Davis v. Potter, 51 Idaho 81, 2 P.2d 318 (1931) (surgeon's failure to
supervise nurse); Meistinsky v. City of New York, 309 N.Y. 998, 132 N.E2d 900
(1956) (memorandum decision) (failure to train police officer).
30 See Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180
N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958) (failure of the city to protect plaintiff's intestate, a police
informer) ; Harper & Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43
YALE L.J. 886, 887 (1934); Comment, "59 CoLUm. L. IEv. 487, 491-92 (1959). See
generally Snyder, Liability for Negative Conduct, 35 VA.. L. R . 446 (1949).
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seems adaptable to the present case. The parties stipulated that the pos-
sibility of a second attempt at suicide was highest on the same day as the
first 8 1 and that it was the superintendent's duty to see that suicidal patients
were properly cared for 2 The nurse assigned to care for the deceased was
on a regular shift and had at least twelve other patients undet her care.83
In the light of this evidence an affirmance based on personal negligence
alone would not have been inappropriate. This conclusion is also suggested
by the fact that if the jury had based its decision on respondeat superior-
the trial court said that "the jury might have based its verdict either on
the doctrine of respondeat superior or on the doctrine of simple negli-
gence" 34-they would necessarily have found negligence on the part of the
superintendent's servant. If a nurse who "was only doing as directed, and
. . . faithfully followed her instructions" 35 was negligent, the superior
officer who promulgated those instructions was also arguably negligent in
failing to make provision for more detailed care of suicidal patients. The
resulting liability would be analogous to that under an "incentive" theory
of respondeat superior, which would hold a master liable in order to stim-
ulate more vigorous control and discipline of subordinates,3 6 but it would
have two advantages over it: The higher duty demanded would extend only
to the creation of more exacting instructions for the care of suicidal pa-
tients; if a jury found that a superintendent had promulgated such instruc-
tions and enforced them, he would be free of negligence and could not be
held for any accidental or intentional deviations from instructions by his
subordinates. Moreover, such a holding would not create a precedent for
the extension of respondeat superior to other types of public officials.
3 7
3 1 Brief for Respondents, p. 11.
32 More specifically the parties stipulated that the superintendent had the respon-
sibility to see that there were personnel present to care for the suicidal patient
properly, id., p. 14, that customary procedure required the detention of attempted
suicides for several days, id., pp. 5-6, that proper nursing care of such patients
required constant surveillance when items were present which could be used in fur-
ther attempts, id., p. 7, that there was no special psychiatric section in the hospital, id.,
p. 16, and finally, that any nurse on the floor might be assigned to care for such
patients, id., p. 16.
33 Instant case at 558.
34 Kent v. Whitaker, No. 139192, Wash. Super. Ct., May 2, 1960.
35 Ibid.
36 See Morris, The Torts of an Independent Contractor, 29 ILL. L. Rxv. 339,
340-41 (1934).
87 Insofar as the creation of negligence liability for a supervisor's failure to
supervise would result in increased salaries or municipally supplied insurance for
such supervisors, this decision would result in a circumvention of municipal immunity.
Since this immunity lacks even the justifications said to support immunity for
charitable trusts-the power to tax assures to the municipality the ability to con-
tinue to provide necessary services-, see Borchard, Government Liability in Tort,
34 YALE L.J. 229, 249 (1925) ; Fuller & Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Opera-
tion, 54 HARV. L. Rxv. 437, 441 (1941), the circumvention of its operation is to be
lauded, particularly in the light of the unwillingness of courts to attack the immunity
directly, see, e.g., Stang v. City of Mill Valley, 38 Cal. 2d 486, 240 P.2d 980 (1952).
But the fact that the agency holding in the instant case may also serve as precedent
to extend further the liability of public officers whose actions provide no tenable
basis for a finding of personal negligence vitiates any positive value of the case.
